How America’s shale strategy is fueling a new energy boom in the Middle East

How America’s shale strategy is fueling a new energy boom in the Middle East
How America’s shale strategy is fueling a new energy boom in the Middle East

The highly focused development of the US shale oil and gas sectors since the early 2010s transformed it from one of the world’s largest importers of both to one of its largest exporters of both. But it did much more than that: it reversed the balance of energy power in the world from where it had left it at the end of the 1973 oil crisis. As forecasts for gas demand continue to rise due to fears of new global conflicts and the dramatic expansion of data centers around the world, the Middle East is seeking to expand its own gas production, particularly with a view to developing its own shale resources. In this context, the United States is seen by these countries – most notably Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) – not as a future competitor but as a key knowledge resource, a status that Washington is happy to adopt. After all, becoming an integral part of any country’s energy production is as good a way as any—and a better way than most—to keep those relationships working best for the United States.

It is interesting to note at this point the circularity of the story, although with a twist. Prior to 1973/74, the global oil industry had effectively been run by a small group of Western oil companies known as the “Seven Sisters”, as detailed in my latest book on the new global oil market order. These companies, made up of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company (which changed its name in 1935 to the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, and is now BP), Royal Dutch Shell, three iterations of Standard Oil (Standard Oil of California, Standard Oil of New Jersey and Standard Oil Company of New York), Gulf Oil and Texaco, were able to control oil exploration, development, transportation and prices for decades, until October 1973. At that time, members of OPEC led by Saudi Arabia, as well as Egypt, Syria and Tunisia, began an embargo on oil exports to the United States, the United Kingdom, Japan, Canada and the Netherlands in response to their support for Israel in the Yom Kippur War. By the end of the resulting crisis, in March 1974, the price of oil had risen from around $3 per barrel (bp) to almost $11 per barrel before stabilizing for a time, before returning to an upward trend. This, in turn, fueled the fire of a global economic slowdown, especially felt in the West. The then Saudi Minister of Petroleum and Mineral Reserves, Sheikh Ahmed Zaki Yamani, highlighted that the extremely negative effects of the oil embargo on the West marked a fundamental shift in the global balance of power between developing nations that produced oil and developed industrial nations that consumed it.

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